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1  IN'rRODUCTION
A cornerstone  of the auction literature  is the theory  of "optimal  auctions."' This theory  uses
mechanism  design  techniques  to characterize,  in general  settings,  the auction  that maximizes  the seller's
expected  revenues. One feature  of the solution  is that typically  there is a conflict  between  the goals of
revenue maximization  and efficiency. The revenue-optimizing  seller often  either places goods  in hands
other thln those who  value them the most or withholds  goods  entirely  from the market. However,  the
conclusion  that the seller gains by assigning  goods  inefficiently  depends  critically  on two strong
assumptions:  (1) the seller can prevent  resale among  bidders from occurring  after the auction;  and (2) the
seller can commit  to not sell the withheld  goods  after the auction. In this paper, we examine  how the
optimal auction  problem  changes  when one or both of these assumptions  are relaxed.
When  the seller  cannot ban resale, the bidders  may undo the seller's inefficient  assignment  from
the auction. If agents  understand  and anticipate  this, the incentives  that the seller attempted  to create  in
the solution  to the mechanism  design  problem are  undermined,  and so the "optimal"  auction  may cease  to
be optirmal.  Coase (1960)  has criticized  standard  economic  analyses  of the law that assume  away the
possibility  that economic  agents may  recognize  any gains from trade, by instead  making the opposite
extreme assumption  that all gains from trade are realized. For most of this paper,  we will adopt  the Coase
Theorem  by assuming  perfect resale. Resale causes  any misassignment  of the goods  to be corrected.
This is an extreme  assumption. Certainly,  there are settings  where  perfect resale is not possible,  because
of private information  that the auction  winners  have  after the auction  (Myerson  and Satterthwaite  1983;
Cramton,  Gibbons  and Klemperer 1987). However,  there are other  settings  where  perfect resale is
possible. Perfect  resale has the significant  advantage  that it is a simple  and general  assumption  on the
resale market. Moreover,  since  resale is voluntary,  resale inevitable  shifts outcomes  toward  the efficient
assignment. We view perfect resale as a good  first-approximation  of many  resale markets.
Wlhen  the seller cannot commit  to refrain from selling  the withheld  objects after the auction,  the
seller may himself  undo the inefficient  allocation  of the auction. Again,  if agents  understand  and
anticipate  this, the "optimal"  auction  may cease to be optimal.  Coase (1972)  has criticized  standard
economic  analyses  of durable  goods  monopoly  that assume  the seller has  full commitment  powers,  by
instead making  the opposite  extreme  assumption  that the seller has no commitment  powers. In parts of
this paper,  we will take the Coase  Conjecture  seriously  and explore  the implications  of no commitment
powers by the seller. Without commitment,  all inefficient  withholding  of the goods  is corrected. Again,
this is an extreme  assumption. Certainly,  there are reasons  why the seller may credibly  withhold  goods
from the market for long periods  of time (Ausubel  and Deneckere 1989). That said, the Coase  Conjecture
remains a simple  assumption  on post-auction  behavior  whose  implications  are certainly  worth exploring,
' This  research  began  with  Myerson  (1981)  and  has  since  been  extended  by many  others,  for  example,  Engelbrecht-
Wiggans  (1988),  Cremer  and  McLean  (1985,  1988),  Maskin  and  Riley  (1989),  McAfee  and  Reny  (1992),  and
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and may at least be an acceptable  assumption  for modeling  real-world  situations  where the seller chooses
not to utilize any reserve  price.
Armed with the Coasean  assumptions,  we state and solve three  optimal auction  programs:
1.  Unconstrained  optimal  auction. The seller can forbid  resale and commit  to not selling
additional  goods  after the auction. Hence,  the seller  maximizes  revenues,  under the
hypothesis  that resale among  buyers is impossible.
2.  Resale-constrained  optimal  auction. The seller  can withhold  supply, but cannot  prevent
resale. Thus,  the seller maximizes  revenues,  subject  to the constraint  that there will be
perfect  resale among  bidders after the auction.
3.  Efficiency-constrained  optimal  auction. The seller  can  neither withhold  supply,  nor
prevent  resale. Hence,  the seller maximizes  revenues,  subject to the constraint  that there
will  be perfect resale among  the seller and bidders  after the auction.
We analyze  an "independent  signals" model  with multiple  identical  objects. Each  risk-neutral
bidder has a private signal  about its demand  for the good. A bidder's demand  depends on everyone's
signal, and the signals  are independent. This model includes  both private  value and common  value
models as special cases. It allows ex ante asymmetries  among  bidders.
Each of the optimal  auctions  is solved via a general  version  of the Revenue  Equivalence
Theorem:  Any auction  that results in the same assignment  of the goods  yields the same  seller revenues,
provided  that the lowest  bidder  types get the sarne  payoff. Moreover,  when the lowest bidder types are
given zero surplus  (as they  are in any optimal  auction),  this revenue  equals  the marginal  revenues
integrated  over the quantity  won and summed  over bidders. Marginal  revenue  is what the seller gets from
awarding  additional  quantity  to a bidder. It is equal to the bidder's marginal  value less the informational
rent that the  bidder is able to capture  from its private information.
In the unconstrained  optimal  auction,  the seller simply  assigns  the good in decreasing  order of
marginal  revenue,  until the good is exhausted  or marginal  revenue  turns  negative. Goods are assigned  by
moving  down the aggregate  marginal  revenue curve.
In the efficiency-constrained  optimal  auction,  the seller is forced  to assign the goods efficiently.
The seller's only discretion  occurs when  there is a tie in marginal  values  (the aggregate  demand  curve  is
flat). Then the seller  assigns  first to those with the higher  marginal  revenue. Goods are assigned  by
moving down  the aggregate  demand  curve,  until the quantity  available  is exhausted.
In the resale-constrained  optimal  auction,  the seller  has more discretion. Because  of perfect
resale, the seller is forced  to award in decreasing  order of marginal  value  (i.e., by moving  down  the
aggregate  demand  curve),  but the seller can withhold  quantity. The choice of the optimal  quantity  to
award is a simple  one-variable  calculation. The seller's choice of aggregate  quantity depends  on the
bidders' reports of private information,  and is equivalent  to setting  an ex post reserve  price.
We show that, when  a seller cannot  prevent  resale, the seller  no longer has any incentive  to
misassign goods. The seller  can do no better than  assigning  goods  to exhaust  all gains from  trade among
the bidders. This is an extremely  general  result, which does  not rely on any of the standard  assumptions
of the optimal  auction  literature. We, therefore,  prove it in a general  model. The key to the argument  is
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constrained optimal  auction  program. Thus, an equilibrium  of the two-stage  game  cannot result  in greater
revenues.
We next consider  whether  misassigmnent  actually  hurts the seller. Does  the seller  necessarily  get
strictly lower revenues  by any misassignment  of the good? We show  that the answer  is yes in the
identical objects  model. The  seller does strictly better by assigning  the goods  to those with the highest
values. Intuitively,  misassigning  the goods  results in the seller foregoing  a share of the gains from trade
that are ultimately  captured  by the bidders in resale.
Finally, we explore  how a seller can implement  optimal  auctions  with resale. We prove in a
private-value  setting  that the Vickrey  auction is not distorted by resale. When  the seller  uses a Vickrey
auction, sincere bidding  - followed  by no resale  - is an equilibrium  in the auction-plus-resale  game.
Thus, a Vlickrey  auction  implements  the efficiency-constrained  optimal  auction,  if the lowest  bidder  types
get a payoff of 0.2
Our results thus provide  a new defense  for emphasizing  efficient  auction  design rather  than
optimal auction design. 3 The  presence  of a perfect resale market forces  even  the most selfish seller,
whose sole objective  is maximizing  revenues,  to focus  - out of necessity  - on efficiency. While the
Coasean assumption  of perfect  resale is extreme,  it is no more extreme  than the standard  assumption  of
no resale which the auction  literature  routinely makes.
In this paper,  we focus solely  on the Coasean  critiques  of the unconstrained  optimal  auction.  -
Other available critiques  strengthen  our conclusion. For example,  when  one recognizes  that bidder
participation  is affected  by the auction  design, then the case for an efficient  auction  improves. McAfee
and McMillan (1987),  Harstad  (1990, 1993),  and Levin and Smith  (1994, 1995,  1996)  provide
justification why a revenue-maximizing  seller should  care about  efficiency. With endogenous  bidder
participation  and symmetric  bidders,  efficiency  and revenue-maximization  are equivalent. Bulow and
Klemperer (1996) demonstrate  that if a reserve  price discourages  even  a single  potential  bidder  from
participating,  the reserve  makes  the seller worse  off.
Amother  critique  of the optimal  auction  approach  is the severe  informational  requirement  placed
on the mechanism  designer.  The approach  assumes  that the distributions  of private  information  are
commor  n knowledge,  and the optimal  auction  makes explicit  use of this information.  If the seller does not
know the distributions  or is constrained  to adopt auction  rules that are independent  of the distributions,
then implementing  the optimal  auction  may be impossible  (but see Caillaud  and Robert, 1998). In
contrast, the informnational  requirements  of the efficient  auction are often  less severe. In interesting  cases,
the efficient auction  rules may  be independent  of the distributions  of private  information  (see, for
example, Ausubel,  1997).
Our paper,  by introducing  a resale constraint  into the optimal  auction,  is connected  to both the
resale lite:rature  and the optimal  auction  literature. The study of resale  in auction  markets  is just
emerging. Bikhchandani  and Huang  (1989) and Viswanathan  and Wang  (1996)  develop  a model of
2 Krishna  and Perry (1997)  show  that  in a market  without  resale the Vickrey  auction  implements  the efficiency-
constrained[  optimal  auction,  when  the lowest  types get 0.
3 Recent papers emphasizing  efficiency  rather than  revenue  maximization  as the seller's objective  include  Ausubel
(1997), Ausubel  and Cramton  (1998),  Dasgupta  and Maskin  (1997), and  Krishna  and Perry  (1997). The real-world
discussion  of how best  to structure  the FCC spectrum  auctions  tended  also  to emphasize  efficiency  over  revenue
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Treasury auctions,  where resale is especially  important. Bidding  behavior  is significantly  affected  by
resale. Agastya and Daripa  (1998)  also focus  on Treasury  auctions,  emphasizing  the interaction  of the
futures market, the auction,  and resale.  Haile (1998),  using a reduced-form  representation  of the resale
market, characterizes  equilibrium  bidding  behavior  in standard single-good  auctions. Haile (1997)
examines  resale in a setting  where bidders  acquire  additional  information  after the auction.  Haile (1996)
empirically  tests the model  using  U.S. Forest Service  timber data. Horstmann  and LaCasse  (1997)
consider  resale by the seller  to a potentially  different  set of bidders. Our paper  is most closely  related  to
several recent studies  of optimal  auctions  with multiple  goods. For example,  Krishna  and Perry (1997)
find conditions  under which the Vickrey  auction  is optimal among  efficient  mechanisms. Armstrong
(1997) is also interested  in when  an optimal  auction is efficient. He shows  that with two goods  and two
types, the optimal  auction is always  efficient  (this result, however, does not generalize  to three types).
Avery and Hendershott  (1998)  analyze  optimal  bundling  in a multiple  objects  setting.
Our paper is organized  as follows. In section 2, we establish  the seller's general  incentive  to
misassign goods and we identify  settings  where the optimal auction is efficient. In section  3, we solve
two variations on the optimal  auction,  which  recognize  the possibility  of resale. Section  4 proves that
perfect resale destroys  the seller's incentive  to misassign  goods. Section  5 establishes  tiit,  with perfect
resale, any misassignment  of goods  results in strictly lower seller  revenues  than  the best efficient
assignment. In section 6, we show  that the Vickrey  auction is not distorted  by the possibility  of resale.
2  THE INCENTIVE  TO  MISASSIGN  THE  GOOD
There are two ways  an optimal  auction  can fail to be efficient:  (1) the seller  can withhold  some
quantity;  and (2) the seller  can award  quantity  to a bidder with a lower  marginal  value instead  of a bidder
with a higher  marginal  value. Myerson  (1981)  demonstrates  both inefficiencies  in deriving  the optimal
auction in an independent  private  value  auction for a single good. We begin  by examining  the incentive
to misassign goods in a multiple  object  setting.
2.1  Identical  objects  model
For most of the paper,  we consider  a model with multiple identical  objects  or close substitutes.
The seller has a quantity 1 of a divisible  good  to sell to n bidders. The seller's valuation  for the good
equals zero. Each bidder  i can consume  any quantity qi E  [O,Xi],  where Xi E (0,1]. We can interpret  qi as
bidder i's share of the total quantity  being  auctioned,  and Xi  as i's capacity  or quantity  restriction. Let
q = (q  l, -,qn),  Q = {q  I qie [O,Xi]  and  X-i  qi S  1},  and Q = {q I qiE [0,Xi]  and  Xi  qi = 1)}.  Then Q is the
set of all feasible assignments  and Q  is the set of all feasible assignments  in which the seller  sells the
entire quantity  available. Bidder  i has a diminishing  marginal  value, which may depend  on all the
bidders' private information.  Let ti E Ti  be bidder  i's type, t = (tl,...,tn), t-i = t\ti, and ni = min {ti  I ti E
Ti}. The bidders' types are drawn  independently  from the distribution  functions  Fi with full support  on
Ti. A bidder's type is private information;  whereas,  the value functions,  capacities,  and distributions  of
types are common  knowledge.  The bidders  are risk-neutral.  A bidder i with marginal  value  vi(t,qi)  who
receives quantity qi E [O,Xi]  and pays  x for it has a payoff  v:'  v (t,y)dy - x.The Op1imality of Being Efflcient  5
We require marginal  value  to satisfy
Value monotonicity.  For all i,j,  t, qi, vi(t,qi) Ž  0, avi(t,qi)ati  > 0, ovi(t,qi)/1,t;  20, avi(t,qi)/8qi <
0.
Value  regularity. For all i,j, qi, qj, t-i, and ti' > ti, vi(ti,t-i,qi)  > vj(ti,t-i,qj)  =>  vi(t -,t-,qi)  > vj(t ',t
-i,qj).
These conditions  guarantee  that if goods  are assigned in order of marginal  values,  then qi(t) will
be wealdy  increasing  in ti. This model  includes  both private value and common  value  models  as special
cases. In the private value  model,  vi only depends  on ti. In the common  value model,  vi(t)  = vj(t). The
model allows ex ante asymmetries  among  the bidders, both in the bidder's capacity,  Xi,  and more
importantly,  in the value functions  and the distributions  of types.
2.2  The  optimal  auction  with identical objects
We begin by determining  the optimal  auction. This extends  Maskin and Riley (1989),  which
assumes;  symmetry  and private values,  and Bulow  and Klemperer (1996),  which  assumes  symmetry  and a
single good. (See Engelbrecht-Wiggans  (1988)  and Krishna and Perry (1997)  for more  general
treatmernts  of revenue equivalence.)
Define  bidder i's marginal  revenue  as
MRt (t, qi) = vi (t, qi)  I- Fi (ti )  ai  t,  i
f1(t 1)  8t 1
We interpret  MRi(t,qi) as the marginal  revenue  the seller gets from awarding  quantity  to bidder  i after
deducting  the informational  rent that i is able to capture from its private information.  This interpretation
is justified by the following  revenue  equivalence  theorem. Any auction  that results in the same
assigmnent  yields the same  seller  revenue,  provided  that the lowest bidder  types get the same  payoff.
Moreover,  this revenue is simply  the marginal  revenues  integrated  over the quantity  won  and summed
over bidders, when the lowest  bidder  types are given no surplus.
THEOREM  1 ("Revenue  Equivalence").  In any equilibrium  of any auction  game  in which  the
lowest-type  bidders  receive  an expected  payoff of zero, the seller's expected  revenue  equals
(R)  OE{Xn  MR,.(t,Y)dYj.
P'ROOF.  [Note:  The current  draft  assumes  "flat" demands.]  Incentive  compatibility  requires  that ti
does nol:  want to report ti: Ui (ti.) > Ui  (ti) + E_, [(vi  (ti', t..)  - vi (t))qi (t)], so Ul(ti) has derivative
d(ti)  - E,  [(t)  *  - (t,), a.e., and U,(ti) = Ui.(r)+f  ' wi(t)dt  . Thus,
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E,  [Ui (ti)] =  U; (t)  + lfo  fw  (r) dc f1 (ti) dti
=Ui (C)  +  J'(1 - Fi;(t 1 ))w1 (t1 )  dt 1 (by parts)
=Ui(,rj)+  E  (I-  I(t;)  wi (ti))
Expected revenue is the expected value of the good to the winning bidders, E, (Z"  qi  (t)vi (t)),
less the expected  payoff to the n bidders,  E , (U 1(ti)).  Hence, expected  revenue is
E (E (t)(v  (t)  1-;(U  v()  j (  ))  E(  tMt)U()]
From Theorem 1, a revenue-maximizing  seller  will assign  quantity in descending  order of
marginal  revenue, and stop assigning  when  the good  is exhausted  or marginal  revenue  turns negative.
Such an assignment  can be made incentive  compatible  if bidder i's quantity qi(t) is weakly  increasing  in
ti. To guarantee  this we require  marginal  revenue  to satisfy
MR monotonicity.  For all i,,  t, qi, aMRi(t,qi)I8ti  > 0, WMRi(t,qi)latj  0, aMRi(t,qi)Rqi <  0.
MR regularity.  For all i,j,  qi, qj, t-i, and ti' > ti, MRi(ti,t-i,qi)  > MRj(ti,t-i,qj)  => MRi(ti',t-i,qi) >
MRj(ti,tJti,qj)-
THEOREM  2.  Suppose that MR monotonicity and MR regularity are satisfied.  The  seller's
expected revenue is maximized by awarding the good to those with the highest marginal revenues, until
the good is exhausted or marginal revenue becomes negative.
PROOF. Individual  rationality  requires  Ui(ti) 2 0, so the best the seller  can do is set Ui('i) = 0.
Thus, the seller's optimization  problem  is to select  q(t) = (qi (t),.. .,qn(t))  to maximize  (R), where  for all t,
q(t) e Q. This problem is solved  by pointwise  optimization.  Fix t. The seller should  allocate  the good  to
those with the highest  marginal  revenues,  until quantity  is exhausted  or marginal  revenue  becomes
negative. Since quantity  is awarded  in descending  order of MR MR regularity  implies that qi(t)  is
weakly  increasing  in ti, which is sufficient  for q(t) to be consistent  with incentive  compatibility.
Theorem  2 illustrates  both inefficiencies  of the optimal  auction. First, sincevi(t,qi)  >  MRi(t,qi),  it is
possible  for vi(t,qi)  > 0 > MR#(t,qi),  in which  case  the seller  inefficiently  holds  back  quantity. Second,  since
the distribution  of types differs  across  bidders,  it is possible  thatvi(t,qi)  > vj(t,qj) and yet
MRi(t,qi)  <  MRj(t,qj). In this case,  the seller  may  misassign  quantity  toj when  i has a higher  value. For
example,  if one of the bidders  has a higher  value  ex ante,  then the seller  may improve  revenues  by requiring
the ex ante strong  bidder's  bid to beat  the others  by a particular  margin.
2.3  Settings  without  an incentive  to misassign  the good
The incentive  to misassign  the good  is quite general. However,  misassigmnent  does  vanish  in
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First,  suppose  bidders  have flat demands  and are ex ante symmetric:
Flat  demands (constant marginal values). av(t,qi)/aqi  = 0, for qi e [O,ki],  so marginal value is
vi(t).
Symmetry. For all i, j, vi(..,ti,...,tj,...)v(...,t,...,ti,...)and  Fi = Fj =  F.
In this case,  we can restate the regularity  conditions  as:
iValue  regularity. A higher  type has a weakly  higher value:  ti > t  =>  vi(t) 2 vj(t).
MJR  regularity. A higher  type has a higher  marginal  revenue: ti > tj >  MRi(t) > MRj(t).
PROPOSITION  1. In a symmetric,  flat demands  model satisj5ing  both value and MR regularity,
then the seller can maximize  revenues  by awarding  the good to those with the highest values.
PROOF. From Theorem 1, the seller wants  to assign  the good to those with the highest  marginal
revenue,  but by MR regularity,  the highest types  have  the highest marginal  revenues,  and by value
regularity  the highest  types have the highest  values. Hence,  assigning  the good in order of marginal
revenue  also assigns  the good in order of value. Moreover,  MR regularity  implies  that qi(t) is weakly
increasing  in ti, which is sufficient  for q(t) to be consistent  with incentive  compatibility.
From Myerson's (1981)  single-good  analysis,  it is clear that the symmetry  assumption  is essential
to Proposition 1. Can we relax the flat demands  assumption  to downward-sloping  demands? The optimal
selling  procedure  assigns  the good  based on the aggregate  marginal  revenue  curve; whereas,  an efficient
auction assigns  the goods  based on the aggregate  demand  curve. With flat demands,  the assignments
based on aggregate  demand  and marginal  revenue  are identical,  assuming  ex ante symmetry. However,
with downward-sloping  demands,  this typically  is not be the case.
How the revenue-maximizing  assignment  distorts  the efficient  assignment  depends  on the
distribution  of private information. Suppose  the  bidders  have separable  inverse demands,  pi(t,qi) = vi(t) -
gi(qi), where dgildqi  > 0 for all qi. Further suppose  that the intercept  vi(t)  satisfies  the symmetry  and
value regularity  assumptions  of Proposition  1, and that the bidders' types are drawn independently  from
the distribution  F.  In this setting,  any distortion  depends  on the hazard  rate on types,j(ti)/(l-F(ti)).
PROPOsrpION  2. In the symmetric model  with  downward-sloping  demands,  assigning  the good to
those with the highest values  maximizes  revenue  if the hazard rate on types is constant. However,  if the
hazard rate is increasing  (decreasing),  the optimal  auction  distorts the efficient  assignment  by shifting
quantity awayfrom (toward)  low types.
PROOF. From Theorem 1, the seller's expected  revenue  from an allocation  q(t) = (ql(),...,qn(t)),
where the lowest type bidders get 0, is
Y. fol  g[  (xi(t)  fiX)  (Ft()  dx)]The Optimality of Being Efficient  8
If F has a constant hazard rate, then F is the exponential distribution, F(ti) = 1 - exp(-ti/a)  and
[1 - F(ti)]Jl(ti) = a. Hence, the seller's optimization problem is to select an assignment q(t) e  Q to
maximize
q (t) Et  [v  gi(X)-  a]dxJJ
By pointwise  optimization,  the solution  is to assign the good  to those with the highest  marginal
values subject  to the reserve  price r = a, or if constrained  to sell all units,  the seller simply assigns  the
good to those with the highest  marginal  values. There is no incentive  to misassign  since marginal
revenue for all bidders is just the true demand  shifted  down  by a constant. If F has an increasing  hazard
rate, then [1 - F(ti)]/J(ti)  is decreasing  in ti. Thus, a high type's marginal  revenue  curve is shifted  down
less than a low type's marginal  revenue  curve. Hence,  the seller,  by assigning  on the basis of marginal
revenue  rather than marginal  value, misassigns  in favor of the high types. Quantity  is shifted away  from
low types.
Proposition  2 demonstrates  that when bidders  have downward-sloping  demands  the seller
typically does  have an incentive  to misassign  the good,  except for a very special case. Proposition  2 also
provides some intuition  for how revenues  from an efficient  auction  may  compare  with revenues  from a
uniform price auction. For example,  if a bidder's type has an increasing  hazard  rate (e.g., is uniformly
distributed),  the revenue-maximizing  assignment  differs from an efficient  assignment  by shifting  quantity
away from the low-demand  bidders (low types). However,  a uniform-price  auction tends to shift quantity
toward small  bidders, because  of greater demand  reduction  by large  bidders (Ausubel  and Cramton
1998). Hence,  this suggests  that, with ex ante symmetric  bidders, an efficient  auction will revenue-
dominate  the uniform-price  auction in the more  typical case  where the hazard  rate is increasing. 4 At the
very least, there should  not be a presumption  that efficient  auctions  perform  poorly relative to other -
standard  auctions,  such as the uniform-price  auction  or the pay-your-bid  auction. There is little evidence
that these other  standard  auctions  distort outcomes  in ways that enhance  revenues.
A final setting  in which there is no conflict  between  efficiency  and revenue maximization  is
where bidders  receive  no informational  rents. Then  marginal  values  and marginal  revenues  coincide.
Cremer and McLean  (1985, 1988)  and McAfee and Reny (1992)  show  how  the seller can extract  the full
surplus when bidders  are risk neutral,  when there is unlimited  liability,  and when private information  is
correlated. If the seller  can extract all the surplus,  then  the seller can  do no better than an efficient
auction, since this maximizes  the gains from trade, all of which are  received  by the seller.
3  OPTIMAL  AUCTIONS  RECOGNIZING  RESALE
The optimal  auction  described  above  may  be difficult  for a seller  to implement  on two grounds:
(1) it assumes  that the bidders cannot  engage  in resale following  the auction,  and (2) it assumes  that the
4 When there are ex ante asymmetries  among  the bidders,  then it would  seem  possible  for the uniform-price  auction
to yield more revenue than an efficient auction.  For example, if there are a number of ex ante weak bidders (low
demands),  then competition  may be stimulated  in an auction  that  gives these  weak bidders  more favorable
treatment. The uniform-price  auction  effectively  does  just that. Participation  by small  bidders is encouraged,  since
they win larger  quantities  due to demand  reduction  by the stronger  bidders. A uniform-price  auction  also  has the
advantage that it yields a greater diversity of winners, which reduces market power in the aftermarketThe Optimality  of Being  Efficient  9
seller can commit  to not selling  additional  quantity  after the initial  auction. In this section,  we will relax
both of these assumptions. This will result in a total of three optimal  auction  programs:'
1.  Unconstrained  optimal  auction. The seller can  prevent  resale and credibly  hold back
quantity.
2.  Resale-constrained optimal auction.  The seller can credibility hold back quantity but
cannot  prevent  resale.
3.  Efficiency-constrained  optimal  auction. The seller can neither  prevent resale nor
withhold  quantity.
How resale effects  the auction  depends on what we assume  about  the resale market. We take the
Coase (1  960) theorem  seriously  and assume  perfect resale. Resale  causes any misassignment  of the
goods to be corrected. This is an extreme  assumption. Certainly,  there are settings  where perfect resale
is not possible, because  of private information  that the auction  winners  have after the auction  (Myerson
and Sattertriwaite  1983;  Cramton,  Gibbons,  Klemperer 1987). However,  there are other  settings  where
perfect resale is possible. Perfect  resale has the significant  advantage  that it is a simple and general
assumption on the resale  market. Moreover,  resale inevitable shifts  outcomes  toward  the efficient
assignment. Since  resale is voluntary,  resale can only occur if it creates  gains from trade by shifting
goods to higher value uses. To the extent that resale is successful,  we view perfect  resale as a first
approximation  of the outcome  of the resale market.
We can apply  Theorem  1 (Revenue  Equivalence)  to solve for each of the optimal  auctions. In
particular, we  can focus solely  on the assignment  rule q(t), since the payment  rule  x(t) will be determined
from incentive compatibility  and the requirement  that the lowest  buyer types get a net payoff of 0.
Consider  an assignment rule q(t)  E Q. A reassignment  q' of q(t) is feasible if goods are not created or
destroyed: Zi(qi(t) - qi') = 0. An assignment  q(t) e Q is resale-efficient  if for every  t E T,  there does not
exist a feasible reassignent  q' of q(t) such that, for all i, vi(t,qi') >  vi(t,qi(t))  with at least one strict
inequality. This definition  requires  all gains from trade among bidders  to be realized. It permits the
seller to inefficiently  withhold  quantity. An assignment  rule q(t) is ex  post efficient  if it is resale-efficient
and for every t  E T, q(t) E Q.  Ex post efficiency  requires all gains from trade among  the seller and
bidders to be realized.  Let oR be the set of all resale-efficient  assignment  rules and let QR  be the set of
all ex post efficient assignmnent  rules.
Let q*(t), qR(t), and q R (t) denote the assignment rule in the unconstrained, the resale-
constrained, and the efficiency-constrained  optimal  auctions. Then  provided  an appropriate  regularity
condition is satisfied  (which  we discuss  below), the optimal  auctions  can be stated as follows:
UNCONSTRAINED  OPTIMAL  AUCTION.  Maximize  the seller's expected  revenues,  under the
hypothesis that the resale of objects among  buyers is impossible:
W  we do not treat  the  fourth  case  where  the  seller  can  forbid  resale  but cannot  commit  to restricting  quantity,  since
we view forbidding  resale  as a more difficult  task. The seller can unilaterally  restrict  quantity,  but forbidding  resale
is a restriction  on others.  It may  require  enforcement  mechanisms  not available  to the  seller.  Some  procurement
auctions  are exceptions.The  Optimality  of Being Efficient  10
q  (t) eargmaxE  [,fj MR, (t,y)dy].
RESALE-CONSTRAINED  OPTIMAL  AUCTION. Maximize the seller's expected revenues, subject to
the constraint  that there will be perfect resale among bidders after the auction:
q  t  argmaxE  t  Ef  MR, (t, y)dy]
EFFICIENCY-CONSTRArNED  OPTIMAL  AucTION. Maximize the seller's expected revenues,
subject to the constraint that there will be perfect resale among the seller and bidders after the auction:
qT (t)  EEarg maxE, E  o  MR. (t, y)dy.
In each case, the optimal assignment rule is found by pointwise optimization. Fix t. For ease of
notation,  drop the dependence on t and assume that marginal values and marginal values are strictly
decreasing  in quantity.  Let di(p) be i's demand curve (the inverse of vi(qi)); similarly, let ri(p) be the
inverse of MRi(qi).  Then aggregate demand is D(p) = Zi  di(p) and R(p) = Zi ri(p).  Inverting these
curves, results  in the aggregate inverse demand p(4)  and the aggregate marginal revenue MR(4),  where
4  = 5i qi.  Both of these functions are continuous and strictly decreasing in 4  . Let
4* = min{1, 4 s.t. MR(4) = O}.
The unconstrained problem is solved by assigning quantity in order of marginal revenue, until the
good is exhausted  or marginal revenue turns negative (Theorem 2): q  = r(MR(4q))  .
The efficiency-constrained problem is solved by assigning quantity in order of marginal value,
until the good is exhausted: q-iR  = di  (p(l))  .
The resale-constrained problem is solved by assigning the optimal quantity 4 qR  in order of
marginal  value:  q  R = di (p(4 R))  .We  determine the optimal quantity 4R as follows. As additional
quantity is awarded, the fraction that is assigned to bidder i depends on the ratio of the slopes of bidder i's
demand curve and the aggregate demand curve. Hence, the resale-constrained marginal revenue curve is
simply the following weighted average of the marginal revenue curves:
MRR(q)=E(i  P4)  MR, (d i  (p(4))))-
D'(p(4))
Then  4 R  Eargmax  MR  (y) dy.  The optimum occurs either at 1 or at a point where MRR  is 0.
Figure  1 gives an example with two bidders.  The resale-constrained  marginal revenue curve is neither
continuous nor decreasing.  It has a jump at every kink in the demand function, where a bidder is added
to or dropped from the set of bidders that is receiving additional quantity at 4  . In the figure, quantity is
first awarded to bidder 2 and then to bidder 1, since bidder 2 has the higher demand curve.  At the kink inThe Optimality  of Being Efficient  11
the demand curve,  bidder 1 begins  receiving  quantity,  which causes a large  jump up in MRR, since  bidder
I has a high marginal  revenue. Since  the area in triangle A is bigger than  the area in triangle  B, the seller






q  1  quantty
MR 2 R,  1  2
THEOREM  3.  Consider the mechanism (q,x) with q(t) as specified below and x(t) chosen to satisfy
incentive compatibility such that the lowest type of each bidder gets a payoff of 0. Then:
(i)  q *(t)  solves the unconstrained optimal auction ifMR  is monotone and regular.
(ii)  qR(t) solves the resale-constrained optimal auction if value is regular and MR is
monotone.
(iii)  q-R (t) solves the efficiency-constrained  optimal auction if value is monotone and
regular.
PROOF. (i), (ii), and (iii) follow  from Theorem 1, provided  qi(ti,t-i) is weakly  increasing  in ti in
each case. In case (i), from MR regularity,  as i's type increases  its MR ranking  improves. Since  quantity
is assigned  in order of marginal  revenue,  qi(ti,t-i)  is weakly increasing  in ti. In cases (ii) and (iii), from
value relgularity,  as i's type increases  its value ranking  improves. Since quantity  is assigned  in order of
marginal  value, qi(ti,t-i)  is weakly  increasing  in ti.The Optimality  of Being  Efficient  12
4  AN EFFICIENT  AUCTION  IS OPTIMAL  WITH PERFECT  RESALE
In general,  optimal auctions  take advantage  of any ex ante asymmetries  among  bidders,  the
precise shape of demand  curves, and the form and distribution  of private information. Sellers  generally
have an incentive  to misassign  the good. However,  misassignment  means that there are gains from  trade
in the resale market. In the remainder  of the paper,  we assume that the seller cannot  prevent  resale. We
show that the possibility of resale undermines  the seller's ability to gain by misassigning  the good. The
best that the seller can do is conduct  an efficient  auction.
Our main result is that when a seller  cannot  prevent resale, the seller no longer  has an incentive  to
misassign  the good. The seller can do no better than to assign  the good to those with the highest  values.
This is an extremely general  result that does not rely on any of the standard assumptions  of the optimal
auction literature. We, therefore,  introduce  a general  auction model.
There are n bidders  (i = 1,...,n) and one seller (i = 0). An assignment  of goods  is q E Q _ Q1x...
xQn for the bidders and qo E Qo for the seller. An assignment  of money is r E Sn  for the bidders  and ro
= 9  for the seller. An allocation  of goods  and money  is a E A  Qx  n for the bidders and ao E A 0 Qo
x9i for the seller. Trade neither creates  nor destroys  money or goods. Given an initial allocation  (a. ,),
the final allocation  (ao,a) is feasible  if budget  balance  is satisfied  in both money  and goods:
n
(BB)  E  =0.
i=O
Given an allocation  a, a reallocation  a' among  the bidders is feasible if budget  balance  is satisfied
in both money and goods:
n
(BB')  E  (ai  - ai  ) = ° .
Bidder i's private infornation is its type  ti E Ti (possibly  multidimensional).  A realization  of
types is t  E  T=- Tlx .. xTn, and t-i  = t\ti.  Types  are drawn from the probability  measure  F on Tand dFi(t
-ilti)  is the conditional probability of t-i given ti. Utility is ui(t,a) for bidder i and uo(ao) for the seller.
This specification  allows for asymmetries,  extemalities,  complementarities,  and risk aversion.
A direct mechanism, 4(alt), is a probability measure on A for each t E T. Bidder i's interim utility
from reporting ti' when its true type is ti in the direct mechanism is
Ui(ti  Iti=  f  f ui(ti,t-i,a)d+(alti  ,t-i)dFi(t-ilti),
t  reT. a eA
and Ui(ti)  - Ui(tilti)  is ti's equilibrium  payoff. Utility is normalized so that the status quo  yields
an interim  payoff of 0 for each bidder. The direct  mechanism 4  is incentive compatible  if
(IC)  Ui(ti) > Ui(ti'lti) for all ti,ti' E Ti,
and individually  rational  if
(IR)  Ui(ti) 2 0 for all ti E  Ti.The  Optimality  of Being Efficient  13
An allocation  rule a(t) is resale-efficient  if for every t e T, there does not exist  a feasible
reallocation  a' of a(t) such that for all i1,.  .,n, ui(t,a')  2 ui(t,a(t))  with at least one strict inequality.  An
allocation  rule (ao,a(t)) is ex  post efficient  if for every  t e T, there  does not exist a feasible  reallocation
(ao',a') of a(t) such that for all i=l,.
(EE)  ui(t,a') 2 ui(t,a(t))  and uo(ao')  2 uo(ao) with at least one strict inequality.
A reallocation  a' of a(t) is an individually  rational  reallocation  if ui(t,a') 2 ui(t,a).  Define:
Ef(t,a) = {a'eA s.t. a' is a feasible and IR reallocation  from a(t) and a' is resale-efficient}
Effit) = {a'c-A  s.t. a' is a feasible  allocation  and a' is resale-efficient}
Given an initial allocation  (4O  ,a), the seller's optimal  auction  program is
max  f  fuo(a 0)d+(a,t)dF(t)
teTaeA
subject  to (IC), (1R),  and (BB).
The seller's resale-constrained  optimal  auction  program  is the same  with the added  constraint:
(RE)  c(A'It) =  O if  A'n  Eff (t) = 0.
We need to define an auction followed  by perfect resale. Let aeA be the allocation  entering  the
resale round. Let te Tbe the type vector expressed  by the bidders  in the resale round, and let 4(-Jt)  be the
probability  measure on bidder allocations  at the end of resale. We call this perfect resale if, for every  A'c
A: A'nEfflt,a)  = 0  => O(A'Jt)  = 0.
T[EOREM 4.  The  seller's expected  utility  from any auction  followed by perfect resale can be no
greater than the solution  to the  seller's resale-constrained  optimal  auction  program. Hence,  a revenue-
maximizing  seller assigns  goods to bidders  so as to exhaust  all gains  from trade among the bidders.
PROOF.  Consider any equilibrium  a of the auction  plus perfect resale and let 0(alt)  denote  the
probability  measure  on outcomes  of a as a function  of the type realization.  4(alt) is resale-efficient,  since
for any A'c  A, if A'r'Efftt) = 0, then A'rEffit,a) = 0, for all aeA, and so by the definition  of perfect
resale, 4(A'lt)  = 0. Since  participation  in the auction  plus resale  is voluntary, 0(aIt)  must satisfy  (IR).
Finally, one deviation  available  to type ti of bidder i, but by no means  the only available  deviation,  is to
pose as type ti' in both the auction and the resale  round. In order for all such deviations  to be
unprofitable,  4(alt)  must satisfy (IC). Since the outcome  of a satisfies  all the constraints  of the seller's
resale-constrained  optimal  auction  program,  the seller's expected  utility from a can be no greater  than  the
solution  to this program.
5  THE SUBOPTIMALITY  OF BEING  INEFFICIENT
In the  prior section,  we proved generally  that a seller, faced  with a perfect resale market,  does
best by holding  an efficient auction. In this section,  we demonstrate  the stronger result  that an inefficient
auction, when followed  by perfect resale,  yields strictly  lower expected  revenues  than an efficientThe Opdmality  of Being  Efficient  14
auction. This suggests  a general  prescription  for auction design  that, when  perfect resale is a good
approximation,  a revenue-maximizing  seller may do best by selecting  an auction  which makes  resale
unmecessary.
To keep the analysis  manageable,  we will consider  the identical-object  model of Section  3, but
with discrete types. We begin  by modifying  the usual optimal-auctions  apparatus  to accommodate
discrete types.
5.1  The optimal auction with discrete types
There are n bidders and a divisible good.  Bidder  i's private  information  is its type ti e  Ti, where
we will now assume that 27  = {tit  ,...  , t/4 3 is a finite set, and t,l <.  < t;K  . A realization of types is denoted
t e  Ta Tlx  x...xTn, and t-i = tei. Types are drawn independently  according  to the probability  distribution
F&)  on Ti, where  ,  )--Pr(t1 ￿ti  ),  i(t)  )Pr(ti  = tk),  and f  -(t  lPr(t  i) =J4f(t  ) *  We
j#i
assume that Fi(.) has full support  on Ti, i.e., fi(tik  ) > 0 for all i and k. As one useful additional  piece of
notation, if ti = tik, then we will write tiE  to mean ti+.  When there  is no ambiguity,  we may also write
rt to mean  (tik+',  t-i).  Define  bidder  i's interim  value if it is type  tk and reports tito be
vi (tiltf  ) -- Et  (  Vi (ti,tiY)) 
and let Xi (tk)  =  E_j  [x  (t4k,  t_;)]  be bidder i's interim payment from reporting  tik.
Analogous  to the standard  treatment  of continuous  types, it is possible to define marginal  revenue
functions as well  as regularity  conditions  so that, when  the seller solves  any of the unconstrained,  resale-
constrained,  or efficiency-constrained  optimal  auction  programs,  the resulting  mechanism  (q,x)  has the
property that qi(ti,t-i)  is weakly  increasing  in ti. We briefly develop  these  features as follows.  The
following  notation  will facilitate  the exposition. For any i, k, 1,  let ICi(kl) denote  bidder i's incentive-
compatibility  constraint  that type tit finds mimicking  type t'  unprofitable:
Vi  (tiI ti )-jt  i  (til  Itik  _-Xi (t, } -
Let IRi(k) denote  bidder  i's individual-rationality  constraint  that type ti  earns a nonnegative
payoff from participating:
Vi  (tik|t,k )Xi  (tik)  2 0 -
We have
LEMMA  1. Suppose that qi(ti,t-j)  is a weakly increasingfunction  of ti,  for  every i = 1,...,n, and t-i
E  T-i.  Also suppose that the transfer function x maximizes the seller's expected profits  over all
mechanisms  (qx) that  satisf  IC and IR.  Then  the incentive  constraints  for nonconsecutive  types  are
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PROOF.  For any  k > 1  > m, we will demonstrate  that WCi(k,l)  and ICi(l,m)  imply  IC(k,m),
establishing  that the latter  constraint  is redundant. Adding  WCi(k,l)  and ICi(l,m)  yields
Vi(tkl1t,k  _-Xi(til  > Vi(tmI|t,k  _-Xi  (ti,"  )+  [Vi(t,|ltl )-Yr(til Iti)]  [V(ti-  It,  k)-,t 
The expression  in braces  may be expanded  to
q  f(m,,V  (ti  ,tj  k  ,)  - Vi(t,  ,t ij,y)]dy f  i  (t-i
Since  qi(ti,t-i) is a weakly  increasing  function  of ti, qi  (t,' t_i) > qi  (tm  ,t-i) . By value
monotonicity, v;  (t,k,  t- , y) 2 vi  (t ,t  t,  y) , for every t-i and y.  Thus,  the expression  in braces  is
nonnegative,  allowing  us to conclude  that ICi(k,m)  is automatically  satisfied.
Iterative application  of this result  immediately  shows that the incentive  constraints  for
consecutive  types imply  all the other  incentive  constraints. This establishes  that the incentive  constraints
for nonconsecutive  types  are redundant.
LEMMA  2. Suppose  that qi(ti,t-i) is a weakly increasingfunction  of ti,  for every  i = 1,..  .,n.  Also
suppose that the transferfunction  x maximizes  the  seller's expected  profits over all mechanisms  (q,x) that
satisfy IC andIR.  Then,for every  k = 2,. ..,Ki, constraint  ICi(k,k-l) is binding.
PROOF. Suppose  not. Then  there exists kŽ2 such that
8  -[Vj(tkik  _t  )Xi(tk)3-[Vi(tk-  ltk )Xi(tk-  )] >O-
C'onsider  any alternative  payment  rule, x', which is selected  so that Xi'(ti) satisfies
Xi'  (tl)  =Xi(til)if  1< k
[Xi  (t,  ) + 6  if 1_k.
Observe  that the incentive  constraints  ICi(l,l-l)  and ICi(l-l,l), for I < k and I > k, continue  to be
satisfied  by (q,x'). Meanwhile,  ICi(k-l,k) has been loosened,  and ICi(k,k-l) continues  to be satisfied  by
construction. Finally,  IRi(l) continues  to be satisfied  by (q,x'), while  ICi(k+l,k)  and IRi(k) inductively
imply Iri(k+1). Since  (q;c  ) yields  strictly greater  expected  revenue  than (q,x  while  still satisfying  all the
requisite constraints,  we conclude  that the hypothesis  that the transfer  function  x maximizes  the seller's
expected profits over all direct  mechanisms  (qx) is violated. This contradiction  proves the lemma.
In light of Lemmas  1 and 2, it is sensible  to examine  direct mechanisms,  (q,x),  with the
properties that constraint  ICi(k,k-1)  is binding  and qi(ti,t-i) is a weakly  increasing  finction of ti. (The
latter property will soon  be guaranteed  by a regularity  condition.)  Let U 1(t)  denote  the equilibrium
utility attained by type tk , and define
4  _=E,;(l  [vi Of  ,t- E  ,y)  - vi (tik- ,t  iy]y The  Optimality  of Being  Efficient  16
The fact that constraint  ICi(kk-l) is binding implies  U,(ti)  =  Ji(tn')  + a.,  and so
k
Ui (tik)  Ui (ti,  ) + 2  Aii  -
j=2
Steps analogous  to the standard  derivation  lead us to define the discrete  version  of the marginal
revenue function:
Ifi(t1 ) MR.  (t,  y) =  vi  (t,  y) -fA  (t(i) [vi  (t+  i y) - vi  (t,y)]-
The seller's problem  is then  to select {q1(t),...,qn(t)} which maximizes
E,[X-U  (t  )+fo  MRi(t,y)dy1]
pointwise,  for all te T.
5.2  An inefficient  auction  does  strictly worse than  an efficient  auction
We now demonstrate  that, in an auction  followed  by perfect resale, the seller  does strictly  worse
than optimal if the goods are assigned  at auction  in such a way that resale is required.
Let v-i(t,q-i) denote  the opportunity  cost of bidder i winning additional  quantity,  i.e.,  the
marginal  value of additional  quantity  allocated  efficiently among  bidders  other  than bidder  i, when the
state is t and a quantity of q-i is already  allocated  efficiently among  bidders  other than  bidder  i. We
require
High Type Condition.  If Xi is the maximum  quantity that bidder i can win at auction,  then
V,  (tiK' , t_i,Xi)  2 v_ ,(tiKi  , t_i, 1-  Xi),  for all t_i e T_i  .
DEFINITION.  In a monotonic  auction,  the quantity assigned  to bidder i in state (ti,t-i) is weakly
increasing  in ti.
THEOREM  5. Consider  a monotonic  auction  followed by strictly-individually-rational,  perfect
resale, in a setting satisfying  the  regularity  condition  and the high type condition. If, in any equilibrium
a, the ex ante  probability of resale  is strictly  positive, then the seller's expected  revenues  are  strictly less
than the optimum  (while  an efficient  auction  attains  the optimum).
PROOF. Let qi(t) denote  the quantity  owned  by bidder i after resale,  and let xi(t) denote  its
combined net payment in the auction  plus resale,  when the bidders' types are t and the equilibrium  C is
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Suppose,  contrary  to the conclusion  of the Theorem, that the ex ante probability  of resale  is
strictly  positive under a, but that seller  revenues  are optimized. We will establish  a contradiction.  Since
resale is assumed perfect, (q,x)  must solve  the seller's resale-constrained  optimal  auction  problem. By
Theorem 1, qi(ti,t-i) is a weakly  increasing  function  of ti, and by Lemmas 1 and 2, the downward
incentive constraints  between  consecutive  types are binding. Let bidder i be one of the  bidders  whose  ex
ante probability  of reselling  is positive,  and define
k  = max {k I  type ti  of bidder  i resells in equilibrium  ca  with positive  probability}.
By the high type  condition,  observe  that k  < Ki. Furthermore,  observe  from the definition  of k
that
(  vi (t;T'  _,t  ,qi (tiT, ,t-i ))2  ;  -i(tiT,  -i,  I- qi (t;  ,t  i)), for all t-i ET  71,
smice  otherwise,  type t, 1 of bidder  i would also have a positive  probability  of trade  in a perfect
resale round.
Now suppose  that tjE+'  mirnics  t4 in the auction.  By inequality  (*), even  if bidderi  owned
qi  (tik +,  ;) units at the end of the auction,  its marginal  unit would  be worth  no more  to bidders  -i than to
type tik+ of bidder i. Bythehypothesis  thatthe auction  is monotonic,  qi(tk ,t-i) ￿qi(t4k+lt  i)  . By the
hypothesis  of weakly diminishing  marginal  values,  given that bidderi  only owns qi  (t, ,t)  units at the
end of the auction, its marginal  unit is certainly  worth  no more to bidders -i than  to type  tTi+ of bidder  i.
Thus, by the hypothesis  that  resale  is strictly  individually-rational,type  tF+1  of bidder  i would  find it
strictly unprofitable  to resell to other  bidders.
Let UC  (tik  It')  denote  the optimal  payoff  to til from mimicking  tik in the auction  but  then
continuing  optimally  (given  its true  type)  in the  resale  round. By contrast,  letU,(t4jt1) denote  the  payoff to
tZ  from  mimicking  tik in the  auction  and then  being  forced  to continue  to mimic  tik in the resale  round. The
previous  paragraph  has established  that U'i(tk  It  k+') > Ui(tik  Itk+').  Meanwhile,  observe  that
j(ti+'Iti')=  U1(t4k+' 1 tI+').  Consequently,  the fact (from Lemma  2) that Ui(t kjt 1 +') = Ui(tk+  'Itjk+')
implies that Ui(titIti')>  Ui(tI4t'),  yielding  a profitable  deviation  for type t4+' in the auction
followed  by resale, and hence  contradicting  the hypothesis  that a is an equilibrium. We conclude  that the
seller's revenues are strictly  less than  optimal.
6  IMPLEMENTING  AUCTIONS  WITH RESALE
Our final question  is: Can the seller  implement  the efficiency-constrained  optimal  auction  with
an auction followed  by resale? Since  this two-stage  game (auction  plus resale)  has additional  constraints
not present:  in the direct mechanism,  adding  the  possibility  of resale may prevent the seller  from
implementing  an efficient  auction. We first demonstrate  that the Vickrey  auction  is not distorted  by
resale. Then we determine  the circumstances  under which a Vickrey  auction implements  the efficiency-
constrained  optimal  auction. Unlike  some of our earlier results, this result  does not depend  on perfectThe Optimality  of Being  Efficient  18
resale - any individually-rational  resale will  do. The result also allows correlated  types, asymmetries,
and dissimilar  objects. However,  we assume  private  values: a bidder's value only depends  on its own
type and not the types of the others. This represents  the most general conditions  under which  there is a
dominant  strategy efficient  mechanism  (Vickrey  1961;  Clarke 1971;  Groves 1973).
6.1  The  Vickrey  auction is not distorted by the possibility  of resale
Consider  the general  model of section  3 with the following  restrictions. Let Q be the set of all
possible assignments  of the goods. A bidder's  value vi(ti,q) for the assignment  q E Q only depends  on its
own type ti. Also, a bidder's utility is its value  less the amount  it pays: vi(ti,q) - xi.
In the Vickrey  auction,  the bidders  report  their types and then the seller selects  the efficient
assignment;  that is, q*(t) that maximizes  vl(tl,q*)+..-  +vn(tn,q*).  In the Vickrey  auction,  bidder  i pays
the opportunity  cost of its influence  on the assignment:  the best that the others can do without  bidder  i
less what the others get in the best assignment  with i. Let v(i (t) = 5v 1 (tj,q  (t)) denote  what  the others
Ji~'
get in the best assignent  with i. Then  bidder  i's Vickrey  payment is
x,(t)  =  EaX{vj(tj,q)i  -}v 1 (t).
With this payment,  bidder  i gets a payoff vi(ti,q*)  - xi(t) equal to the incremental  value that i
brings to the auction.
THEOREM  6.  Suppose that each bidder's value depends exclusively on its own type and on the
overall assignment of the goods.  Consider the Vickrey auction followed  by any arbitrary, individually-
rational resale.  Then sincere bidding -followed  by no resale - is an equilibrium of the two-stage game.
PROOF. From the definition  of the Vickrey  pricing rule, for all i, ti, t(, and t-i:
xi(ti  ,ti)  - xi(ti,t-i)  = v-i(ti,t-i)  - v4ti'ti).
Integrating  with respect to dF(t-ilti):
M*  Xi(ti'lti)  -Xi(tilti)  = v4tilti)  - v(ti'lti)-
Now define Ai(ti'lti)  to be the expected  available  gains from trade if bidder i misreports  ti' when
its true type is ti: Ai(ti'!ti) = Vi(tilti) + V-i(tilti) - Vi(ti'lti)  - V-i(ti'lti). Given that resale is individually
rational, bidder i who misreports ti' when its true type is ti cannot expect to earn more  han  Ai(ti'lti) in the
resale round. Let Tci(ti'lti)  be the gain  to bidder  i from misreporting  ti' when its true type  is ti. Then
7Si(ti'iti) o Vi(ti'lti) -Xi(tiglti)  +  vi(tielti)  - [Vi(tilti)  -Xi(tilti)]i
Substituting the definition of Ai(tf'lti) gives
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and substituting  (*) yields 7ri(ti'lti)  S 0. Thus,  we conclude  that any misreporting  of type remains
unprofitable  when resale is possible.
6.2  The  Vickrey  auction  implements the efficiency-constrained  optimal
auction with resale
Now return to the identical objects  model of Section  2 (with continuous  types), for which  the
optimal  auctions  were defined,  but restrict the setting  to private values: vi(tj,qi).  One might guess  that
Theorem  6 irmmediately  implies that a Vickrey  auction  implements  the efficiency-constrained  optimal
auction. However,  this is not the case unless  the lowest  type  bidders get an expected  payoff  of 0: Ui(ti)
0. Of course,  we could add Ui(ri) to bidder  i's payment  for all t to assure that the worst-off  type  of bidder
i gets an expected  payoff of 0. This modified  Vickrey  auction  would still satisfy incentive  compatibility
and individlual  rationality  as a direct  mechanism. However,  a bidder  may do better by not participating  in
the auction,  and then participating  in resale.
As an example,  consider  a single-good  auction  with two bidders, a weak bidder  with value  vlv  on
[0,11  and a strong  bidder with value  v5 on [11,12]. In the Vickrey  auction, the strong  bidder always  gets
the good and pays the weak bidder's value,  for a net gain  of vs - vw. In the modified Vickrey  auction,
the strong  bidder always gets the good  and pays I 1, for a net gain of vs - 11.  Now suppose  the strong
bidder decides  to bypass  the Vickrey auction. Then  if we assume  the two bidders split-the-difference  at
resale, they would  settle at a price of about  6. But then  the strong  bidder can do better by avoiding  the
modified Vickrey  auction. In general, this incentive  to bypass  the auction goes away only if we make  the
implausible  assumption  that winners  in the auction  get all of the gains from trade in resale.
To avoid  this possibility,  we need a condition  that guarantees  that Ui(ci)  =  0 in the Vickrey
auction. This condition  is essentially  that the lowest type  of a bidder  never adds value to the group  of
bidders.
Low type condition. For all i and t-i,
niax  V(-i,qi)  +  vj(tj,qj);  = max'vj(tj,qj)  -
For example,  if vi(ri,qi)  = 0 for all i and qj, then  the low type condition  is satisfied. Krishna  and
Perry (1997)  assume  the low type condition  and prove that the Vickrey  auction implements  the
efficiency-constrained  optimal  auction  in a market  without  resale. Theorem  6 then implies  that the
Vickrey  auction  can be successfully  embedded  in a market  with resale. We have
COROLLARY  1. Suppose the low type condition is satisfied.  Then a Vickrey auction implements
the efficiency-constrained optimum in an auction followed by resale.
PROOF.  From Theorem  6, sincere  bidding,  followed  by no resale, is an equilibrium  in the two-
stage game. Hence,  the resulting  assigm-nent  q* is efficient. The lowest type of bidder i has an ex post
payoff of
vi(ci,  q*) - x1(r,,t  _i) =vi(ti,q7)  + E v(tiq)  - maxvE Vj (t,  qj)  = 0,
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where the first equality  follows  from substituting  the Vickrey  pricing  rule and the second  follows
from the low type condition. Taking  the expectation  over t-i, we have Ui(ti) = 0, as required.
The low type condition  fails in settings  where it is commonly  known  that one bidder  has a higher
value than the others. The Vickrey  auction  may perform  poorly in this case. This can be overcome  by
the use of an ex ante reserve  price.
7  CONCLUSION
This paper  has shown that, in auction markets  followed  by perfect resale, it is "optimal"  to be
"'efficient." Theorem  4 established  that the seller's payoff from using  any auction format is never greater
than from using the payoff-maximizing  efficient  auction  (followed  by no resale). Theorem  5 established
that, with somewhat  more structure  placed on the problem,  the seller's payoff from using an inefficient
auction format is strictly less than from using an efficient  auction. The intuition  for these  results is that
the end outcome  of the auction-plus-resale  process  may itself be viewed  as a static direct mechanism,  and
therefore it must satisfy  the usual conditions  of incentive  compatibility  and individual  rationality.
Meanwhile,  the two-period  trading  process  introduces  the possibility  that a bidder  may pose as one type
in the auction round  but as a second  type in the resale  round, adding  extra incentive  constraints  to the
problem.
The analysis  of an auction followed  by perfect resale motivates  a resale-constrained  static optimal
auction program,  while  the analysis  of an auction followed  by ex  post efficient  trade motivates  an
efficiency-constrained  static optimal  auction  program. Each of these  new optimal  auction  programs  is of
the same level of difficulty  as the standard  (unconstrained)  optimal  auction  program in the literature,  and
possesses an analogous  solution  (Theorem  3). Naturally,  each of the constrained  optimal auction
programs requires  its own "regularity"  condition  in order to yield a well-behaved  solution,  but the new
regularity  conditions  are actually  less onerous  than  the regularity  condition  required  for the unconstrained
optimal auction  program.
Our results thus provide  a new defense  for emphasizing  efficient auction design  rather than
optimal auction  design. The presence  of a perfect resale  market forces even  the most selfish seller,  whose
sole objective  is maximizing  revenues,  to focus  - out of necessity  - on efficiency.
While the Coasean  assumption  of perfect resale is extreme,  it is no more extreme  than the
standard  assumption  of no resale that the auction  literature  routinely  makes. Thus, we would  argue that
the auction model  with perfect resale should  be used  - as a companion  to the usual auction  model
without  resale  - as an easily-tractable  baseline for analyzing  auction  questions. There seems to be no
broadly-convincing  reason why one model or the other should  be thought  to be the more  realistic
depiction  of general  environments,  yet the policy conclusions  from considering  the disparate  models  may
often be quite  different.
One important  example  of the differing  policy conclusions  that the two models  yield is in the
analysis  of the revenue  properties  of alternative  formats  for the Treasury  auction. In the model without
resale, the revenue  ranking  of the pay-your-bid  auction,  uniform-price  auction and Vickrey  auction  is
inherently  ambiguous  (Ausubel  and Cramton  1998). However,  in a private-values  model  with perfect
resale, this paper has shown that the Vickrey  auction  unambiguously outperforms  the pay-your-bid  andThe Optimaiity  of Being  Efficient  21
uniform-price  auctions,  in terms  of expected  revenues. Given the vast and active  resale market in
Treasury securities,  it seems  safe to assert that the model with perfect  resale is a better description  of the
U.S. Treasury  market  than the model  without any resale, and so its predictions  ought to be taken more
seriously.The Optimality of Being Efficient  22
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